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ON THE (HONEST) TRUTH ABOUT DISHONESTY.  HOW 
WE LIE TO EVERYONE – ESPECIALLY OURSELVES BY 
DAN ARIELY (2013, LONDON, HARPERCOLLINS)
Csongor Hajdu1
Stating the scientific standpoint that people are not rational may raise 
challenges, but would not shock many in this era of science. However, arguing 
that irrationality is logical and consistent might raise attention to this topic of 
behavioral economics. In this latest book by Dan Ariely, The Honest Truth about 
Dishonesty, the author continues discussing the topic he started addressing in his 
earlier book, Predictably Irrational, stating that there is logic and consistency 
behind ‘irrational’ human thinking and action. Ariely goes into more detail 
and narrows down the general topic of irrationality to the topic of cheating, and 
further, to cheating within an organizational environment.
Dan Ariely is James B. Duke Professor of Psychology and Behavioral 
Economics at Duke University (North Carolina, USA) and a researcher of 
behavioral economics. He is the author of several New York Times bestsellers 
(Predictably Irrational 2008; The Upside of Irrationality 2010), and has 
given speeches for TED (a global platform for sharing ideas across a variety 
of disciplines in the form of online conferences) which have been watched by 
several million viewers. 
The core idea of the research described in this book came from the collapse 
of Enron in 2001. This occurred after the company came crashing down after 
having significant success on Wall Street through a series of financial tricks, 
assisted by the board of the company and the accounting agencies it worked 
closely with. Ariely became interested in whether this collapse was due to a few 
dishonest and corrupt individuals, or rather to the general blindness of many. The 
main hypotheses, experiments and findings described in the book are focused on 
examining where cheating and dishonesty come from, what the human capacity 
for dishonesty is, and if it is a widespread problem. This book takes the findings 
of the previous publication to the next level by adding to it practical experience 
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gained since the former’s publication. The book’s structure is easy to follow 
and takes the reader from an overview of the previously described, sometimes 
general consequences to the point where we can explain, or at least understand, 
the underlying causes of such significant financial and social phenomena. 
Ariely’s starting point is that the core element of dishonest behavior – in 
this case, cheating – involves the battle between two forms of motivation: 
namely, ‘rational’ economic motivation which makes people want to cheat, and 
psychological pressure that motivates people to act in a way that convinces others 
that they are good. In parallel, he also argues that people are much more moral 
than they are rational, and that many (surprising) factors can influence decisions 
about (dis)honesty.
The main perspective that is developed throughout the book starts at the level 
of the individual and individual-level drivers, then widens in scope to consider 
the impact of the environment, and ends with a focus on how actions create 
organizational norms. Ariely starts by describing the model most commonly 
used to explain rational behavior (cost-benefit analysis) and then disproves the 
efficiency of this model. He describes several determinants of cheating; firstly, 
distance from the reward (in the form of the payment vehicle, or as physical 
distance) and then details how norms should help prevent this type of cheating. 
His next major argument is that cheating occurs even when individuals have good 
intentions, and that favors have an impact on unconsciously formed preferences 
so individuals may not even be aware of them. He notes at this point the theory 
of rational self-indulgence: in order to avoid depletion of willpower, individuals 
should succumb to temptation once in a while. Up to this point, his arguments 
focus on the individual, but then he changes perspective and examines the wider 
environment and society. He starts this section by describing an experiment 
which revealed that the perception of individuals in society shapes their actual 
personalities in a way that fake self-signaling (like the wearing of counterfeit 
brand apparel) can trigger dishonest action – and more importantly, that such 
action also makes the individual suspect others of being dishonest. Ariely then 
expresses his concern about self-deception, which may increase the chance of 
success but can also be a foundation for a lack of trust and bad decision-making. 
Another dangerous effect relates to the reasoning and justification behind 
dishonest acts, which he considers to be an automatic cognitive response. An 
important finding from Chapter Seven is that creative people cheat more, and not 
because of their increased propensity to problem-solving, but due to their ability 
to justify dishonest action. The next perspective he uses widens the scope of the 
analysis to describe how immoral activities might create general norms, and he 
warns that cheating can be infectious. Another very interesting finding is that 
altruism can increase the propensity to cheat, especially when an actor does not 
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stand to benefit from such dishonest acts and can maintain a clear conscience. 
In the closing chapter the author re-emphasizes the inability of the risk-benefit 
model to explain activity and stresses the need for moral codes and norms.
The book consists of 11 chapters. Ariely starts with an attempt to explain 
cheating through analyzing Becker’s rational cost-benefit analysis model 
(weighing the risk of being caught against potential penalties and benefits, 
generalized as the SMORC model – Simple Model of Rational Choice), and 
highlights why that model fails. He disproves this model through the very first 
experiment he reviews, which involves a test conducted at MIT (the Michigan 
Institute of Technology, USA) that paid people based on how many mathematical 
calculations they performed. The experiment was structured so that either the 
risk of getting caught could be minimized, or potential benefits increased. 
Ultimately, quite a few people cheated a lot, but more people cheated only a 
little, and more importantly, the magnitude of cheating did not change even when 
potential benefits and/or level of risk was increased.
After disproving the SMORC model, Ariely lists those determinants that seem 
to be most feasible for explaining cheating based on his experiments. One of the 
most important such factors was found to be the ‘distance’ the potential reward is 
from actual money: experiments suggest that people generally do not hesitate to 
steal non-monetary objects. For example, an experiment indicated that cheating 
greatly increased when the reward was not money but something else, even if 
only slightly different from (or ‘away’ from) money, such as tokens. The same 
effect was observed regarding physical distance: for example, in golf people are 
much more willing to cheat with a club than with part of their body (either hand 
or foot). At this point Ariely expresses his concern about whether in our current 
society, which is moving towards having a cashless economy, the morals that 
help to avoid cheating will be relaxed. What could still support honest behavior 
is providing people with reminders about standards and norms; this makes them 
act more ethically (for example, mentioning the Ten Commandments or an honor 
code, even if the honor code does not even exist). However, long-term honesty 
cannot be generated even through iterations of such reminders about standards.
From the distance factor, the author moves on to describe moral drivers. 
Ariely considers cheating to be an activity that can be caused by a conflict of 
interest, or even through good intentions. What is not that commonly known, 
but is recognized from experiments, is that owing someone something changes 
aesthetic preferences. The surprising finding is that this phenomenon is due to 
generosity or kindness but originates in a deeper part of the brain. This means 
that favors even influence unconscious behavior. The magnitude of the favors in 
the experiment influenced individuals’ relationships with the benefactor, even as 
regards largely aesthetic preferences (e.g. preferences for paintings). The author 
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considers the results to be shocking, even without consideration of what effect 
financial and economic lobbying could have on the government in this regard, 
or medical company representatives on doctors. In the financial sector the effect 
of financial support (salaries, bonuses, benefits, etc.) can have a crucial effect on 
employees’ opinions about financial activities: these changes in preference may 
not be noticed by the individuals themselves, but they can nonetheless distort 
reality, especially in terms of their influence on the subjective interpretation of 
risks or benefits. Ariely hypothesizes that one solution would be full disclosure, 
through which consumers would be able to discount opinions and make better 
decisions. Unfortunately, experiments have indicated that this would do more 
harm than good: full disclosure creates even more profound effects on those who 
stand in judgment.
Following the moral perspective, Ariely reviews the theory of “ego depletion” 
which states that individuals have a limited amount of willpower that they can use 
to resist temptation. Experiments have shown that when deliberative reasoning 
ability is saturated, the impulsive system gains more control over behavior. This 
influences decision making insofar as individuals make default decisions when 
they are overburdened: a jury is more likely to grant parole in the morning when it 
is refreshed, and PhD committee judges act more favorably when they are served 
food at a dissertation defense. One solution that Ariely offers is to avoid the 
opportunity for cheating, but he also notes that experiments have shown that in a 
depleted condition individuals not only have difficulty resisting the temptation to 
cheat, but also make less effort to avoid such situations. Instead, a good solution 
might be to succumb to temptation once in a while to avoid depletion (the theory 
of rational self-indulgence).
After examining individual-level drivers, Ariely moves towards considering 
the impact of society on cheating behavior. A further determinant in whether 
individuals cheat is how activities are conditioned by how others and society 
perceives individual behavior; this phenomenon clarifies the importance of self-
signaling. People appraise themselves according to how they think others see 
them, a behavior which ultimately shapes their personalities. Ariely argues that 
fake self-signaling can thus lead to “fake actions” and to a higher level of cheating. 
One experiment revealed that wearing fake brands negatively affects personality 
and increases levels of dishonesty (while wearing a genuine product does not 
increase honesty). Moreover, one small step down the road of dishonesty leads to 
more slippery steps; failing in just one small thing may lead to the abandonment 
of a bigger concept as well: cheating thus “evolves” over time with very sharp 
transitions. When people start to consider themselves cheaters in some minor 
way, they start acting according this characterization and their morals further 
loosen. Moreover, this process not only makes the given person less honest, but 
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causes them to judge others to be less honest as well. In terms of faking academic 
credentials, this phenomenon becomes highly relevant: politicians and company 
leaders may be inclined to be more dishonest. Thus, it is very important to come 
down on early signs of cheating, and not to disregard it as an activity with no 
long-term impact. 
Ariely continues to reveal the determinants of dishonesty. The next important 
effect of cheating that he details is self-deception. Experiments show that those 
who (slightly) cheated on an exam considered themselves capable of scoring 
higher on a forthcoming exam: the subjects had convinced themselves that their 
exaggerated performance was their true performance. They also tended to be 
more “willing” to ignore their failures (i.e. not to reconcile or admit them). The 
author raises the concerning question whether public acclaim for results created 
through falsification (and, especially, the receipt of some marker of achievement 
such as a ribbon, trophy, medal, etc.) cements that fiction. The author emphasizes 
that although self-deception may boost satisfaction and increase immediate 
chances of success, it may also build a foundation for bad decision-making and 
a loss of trust.
Following this argument, Ariely goes into detail about how the human brain 
creates preferences – which lead to choices – by creating reasons for action. He 
again confutes the approach that rational action involves following a process of 
rational decision-making, and rather argues that decisions and actions may be 
based on gut feelings which individuals later seek to justify (in terms of their 
rationality) to themselves and to others as well. Measures of brain function 
support this hypothesis: pathological liars have less grey matter but more white 
matter (which is responsible for moral judgment) in their prefrontal cortex. This 
means that such people may have more problems taking morality into account 
but their association is stronger, which combination may make them perfect 
liars, good at rationalizing dishonest activities. A separate test also generated 
the really interesting finding that more creative people were better at coming up 
with explanations for justifying cheating, although intelligence was not found 
to correlate to level of cheating. Fostering a creative mindset (for example, 
by listening to creativity-related words prior to taking action) also enhances 
dishonest behavior.
After reviewing the activities that impact individuals and their perceptions, 
Ariely expands the scope again and examines how dishonest behavior may spread 
and become the norm within an organization. The main goal of the broader 
project was to help explain the financial crisis of 2008. Ariely hypothesizes 
that an infection of dishonesty spread throughout certain environments (such as 
Enron’s workplace), upsetting the natural internal balance (for example, through 
an accumulation of immoral activities that employees experienced around them). 
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In one experiment, the majority of people who acted immorally invited others to 
reassure them that their morals were aligned with those around them. Another 
experiment witnessed a more-than-doubling of cheating when there was a clearly 
recognizable cheater in the group. However, when it became obvious to everyone 
in a following experiment that cheating would have no negative consequences, 
then the level of cheating level went down, suggesting (again) that it was not 
rational cost-benefit calculations that drove dishonest behavior, but the collective 
morality of the environment.
The author then examines the effect of collaboration on individual honesty, 
because through collaboration benefits may accrue both to individuals and 
to others, a phenomenon which may trigger altruistic behavior. One of the 
main reasons for avoiding dishonesty may be the fear of being observed. An 
experiment strongly supported this hypothesis: when a sign indicating that coffee 
was available in return for a donation included a picture of eyes observing the 
likely consumer, three times as much money was collected than when the same 
sign was decorated with flowers.
An important finding of another experiment (which involved only a slight 
modification of the basic experiment used previously to test levels and conditions 
of cheating) is that altruism can increase dishonesty: individuals in the 
experiment cheated more when the group’s benefits depended on their decisions, 
even when the people in the group were total strangers to each other. What is 
more, in standard group interactions, even when participants had got to know 
each other, altruism overpowered supervision and the level of cheating increased. 
This effect was even stronger when the actor did not personally benefit from their 
own cheating behavior, as in this case selfishness was totally eliminated and 
altruism played the major role. Such findings may alter expectations about long-
term collaborative efforts when one would expect more honest dealings between 
provider and client. Medical research shows that the longer a patient-doctor 
relationship exists, the more it results in benefits to the doctor than practical (i.e. 
benefitting the patient) healthcare solutions. 
In the final chapters Ariely argues that in most cases people seem to be more 
moral than economic models of risk-benefit would predict. Throughout the 
experiments few people demonstrated extremely dishonest behavior, and the cost 
of such was much lower than the cost generated by the huge majority who cheated 
only slightly. The same experiment was conducted in China, Israel, Turkey, Italy, 
the United Kingdom and Canada, and the level of cheating was found to be quite 
similar in every culture. 
The 2008 financial crisis can be considered an example of when irrationality 
had huge impacts, and understanding our shortcomings as decision-makers may 
help us avoid similar cases in the future. Ariely suggests that we should strive 
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to understand which forces impact our behavior, and in which direction, and 
then discontinue irrational and harmful activities to avoid getting dragged into 
a vicious cycle: the goal should be to create an end to destructive behaviors, and 
then a reset.
Ariely argues for the importance of religion which can provide a moral 
compass, as well as insight into the behavior of individuals, and associated rules 
(such as the importance of honesty). He observes that several religious texts 
have strong links to the topic of cheating and share the same findings and even 
methods in some cases (e.g. the observations that action impacts preferences, 
favors create loyalty, that conflicts of interest can change perceptions, the need 
for total honesty, that false witnessing erodes social norms, the need for a clean 
restart and a recharge of moral energy; that rules help to reduce moral depletion, 
and that dishonesty may occur for the benefit of others). The key message from 
this relationship should be that reminders about morals and starting over fresh 
can make people more honest, and that dishonest behavior should be stopped 
before it is allowed to happen.
